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USING INTERNATIONAL LAW MORE EFFECTIVELY 
TO SECURE AND ADVANCE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ 
RIGHTS:  TOWARDS ENFORCEMENT IN U.S. AND 
AUSTRALIAN DOMESTIC COURTS 
John D. Smelcer† 
 
 Abstract:  Over the past three decades, indigenous peoples have effected a 
remarkable redefinition of their status and rights under international law, giving rise to an 
emerging distinct customary international law of indigenous peoples’ rights.  Though that 
process is ongoing, the next critical step is enforcing these congealing rights “at home” in 
the domestic courts of indigenous peoples’ surrounding nations.  Australia and the United 
States provide the most difficult and most revealing contexts in which to explore the 
possibilities and limitations of this necessary next step.  The direct enforcement of the 
emerging customary international law of indigenous peoples’ rights is not yet possible in 
either context, and may never be.  However, the strategic use of this new customary 
international law as strongly persuasive authority within Australian and U.S. federal 
courts in domestic causes of action is a promising approach.  This is because Australian 
and U.S. courts have generally become more open to internationally based arguments, 
and because international law has a special place in Australian and U.S. federal 
indigenous peoples’ jurisprudence.  This Comment argues that because this jurisprudence 
was itself founded upon principles of international law, newly emergent principles of 
international indigenous peoples’ rights law should be received into Australian and U.S. 
domestic courts as strongly persuasive authority:  they may not provide a cause of action 
but they can provide a rule of decision.  This process of giving interpretive force to 
international indigenous rights law within domestic federal law might be termed “soft” 
enforcement of international law.  Perhaps the arena in which these principles can most 
clearly be seen and implemented is in the protection of indigenous “cultural sovereignty.”  
This Comment continues by highlighting the promising movements on this front in both 
Australian and U.S. federal courts and how indigenous peoples might utilize principles of 
“soft” enforcement to best secure and advance their “cultural sovereignty” rights.   These 
general recommendations are tested and applied in the final section by revisiting the High 
Court of Australia’s recent Kartinyeri v. The Commonwealth decision and the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Over the past three decades, indigenous peoples have effected a 
remarkable redefinition of their status and rights under international law, 
giving rise to a collection of international norms that are highly favorable to 
their aspirations.1  But as S. James Anaya has powerfully argued, “[i]t is one 
                                                 
 
†
 Juris Doctor expected in 2006, University of Washington School of Law.  The author would like 
to thank Professor Robert Anderson and the Editorial and Production Staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy 
Journal for their assistance throughout the writing process.  Any errors or omissions are the author’s own. 
 
1
  See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.06[2]-[3] (2005); S. JAMES 
ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 56-58, 61-72 (2d ed. 2004); Russell Lawrence 
Barsh, Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: From Object to Subject of International Law?, 7 HARV. HUM. 
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thing . . . for international law to incorporate norms concerning indigenous 
peoples; it is quite another thing for the norms to take effect in the actual 
lives of people.”2  Indeed, meaningful enforcement of these highly favorable 
norms at the local level has been elusive.3  International law has proved to be 
rather Janus-faced for indigenous peoples:  on the one hand international 
law’s concern for human rights and the right of all peoples to determine their 
own political destinies has been the central underpinning to the assertion of 
indigenous peoples’ rights on the international level; on the other hand, 
international law’s traditional structure built upon the twin precepts of state 
sovereignty and consent—with the resulting corollaries of territorial 
integrity, exclusive jurisdiction, and non-intervention in domestic affairs—
has impeded attempts to translate success at the international level to the 
domestic and local level.4  As a result, indigenous peoples wishing to secure 
and advance their rights are faced with an uninviting choice:  they can take 
their claims before often hostile domestic courts that do not recognize 
favorable existing international law, or they can advance their claims before 
more sympathetic but largely toothless international bodies without hope for 
resulting enforcement of whatever decree they might win.  Put simply, the 
important gains achieved at the international level by indigenous peoples 
and their advocates must find their way to the local level in order “to take 
effect in the actual lives of people.”5  The challenge is to find the most 
effective means to make this transition.   
This Comment takes up this challenge in the specific contexts of 
Australia and the United States, arguing that indigenous peoples in these two 
countries should employ the emerging international indigenous rights 
jurisprudence as persuasive authority in asserting their claims in domestic 
courts.  Such “soft” enforcement of international law in the domestic courts 
of Australia and the United States is the most promising avenue available for 
securing and advancing indigenous peoples’ rights through the international 
law principles of both countries.  Direct enforcement in the U.S. and 
                                                                                                                                               
RTS. J. 33, 33-34 (1994).  For a careful identification of core aspirations of the international indigenous 
peoples’ movement, see ANAYA, supra.  
 
2
 ANAYA, supra note 1, at 185. 
 
3
  See Note, International Law as an Interpretive Force in Federal Indian Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
1751, 1751 (2003); COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[4][a][ii]-[iii].  See also Anne Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick, 
International Human Rights Law in United States Courts: A Comparative Perspective, 14 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
1, 2 (1992) (describing American courts’ responses to international human rights claims as “largely, though 
not uniformly, disappointing”). 
 
4
  S. James Anaya, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and International Law in Historical and 
Contemporary Perspective, 1989 HARV. INDIAN L. SYMP. 191, 191 (1990), reprinted in AMERICAN INDIAN 
LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM – CASES AND MATERIALS 1451 (Robert N. Clinton et al. 
eds., 2003). 
 
5
  ANAYA, supra note 1, at 185. 
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Australia is generally unavailable in the absence of a fully crystallized 
customary international law or a binding international treaty schema.  
However, because U.S. and Australian indigenous rights jurisprudence was 
itself founded upon principles of international law, this jurisprudence should 
receive international law as highly persuasive authority. 
 Part II of this Comment examines the emerging customary 
international law of indigenous peoples’ rights, clarifying what has 
“crystallized” and what is still in the process of formation.  In addition, Part 
II identifies and focuses on the “firmest edge” of this emerging 
jurisprudence:  the right to “cultural sovereignty.”  Part III explores the best 
methods for enforcing this generally favorable customary international law 
for indigenous peoples in the domestic courts of Australia and the United 
States.  Part III argues that direct enforcement is currently largely 
unavailable but that international law should be used as persuasive authority 
with interpretive force in domestic courts.  In other words, emerging 
customary law of indigenous rights may not provide a cause of action in 
Australian or U.S. courts, but it can provide a rule of decision.  Part IV then 
applies these general recommendations to the specific context of cultural 
sovereignty, revisiting the High Court of Australia’s recent Kartinyeri v. The 
Commonwealth6 decision and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lyng v. 
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n.7 
 
II.  EMERGING INTERNATIONAL NORMS ADVANCE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ 
RIGHTS 
 
 The last three decades have seen the creation of a powerful new force 
in international law:  an emerging collection of norms favorable to the 
advancement of indigenous peoples’ rights.8  While these new norms have 
found expression in both new and already existing international agreements 
and declarations, to date there has not been an enactment of a comprehensive 
treaty or convention detailing the content and governance of this new 
collection of norms.9  In the absence of such an overarching treaty regime, 
indigenous persons have had to look to principles of customary international 
law to give additional content and binding force to these emerging norms.10  
                                                 
 
6
  Kartinyeri v. The Commonwealth (1998) 195 C.L.R. 337. 
 
7
 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
 
8
  See COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[2]-[3]; ANAYA, supra note 1, at 61-72; Barsh, supra note 1. 
 
9
  See ANAYA, supra note 1. 
 
10
  See COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[4][a][ii]; ANAYA, supra note 1, at 194-200. 
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The following part of this Comment examines these processes and identifies 
and examines two principle aspects of the emerging indigenous rights norms 
that have fully crystallized into binding customary international law. 
 
A.  Customary International Law and International Legal Process Can 
Provide Binding Norms upon Nations 
 
 There are two primary sources of contemporary international law:  
international agreements and customary international law.11  Each has the 
potential to render international norms binding upon nations.  International 
agreements consist of various international instruments (treaties, 
conventions, etc.) that expressly define standards of behavior between 
signatory parties to the instrument.12  Primary examples include the United 
Nations Charter13 and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.14 
Customary international law, though often given reduced attention 
because of its less tangible nature, plays an equally vital role in international 
law and legal processes.15  International customary law consists of the 
general practices or rules of behavior that states observe and follow out of a 
sense of self-perceived legal obligation.16  An example is the prohibition 
against torture.17  Customary international law is to be distinguished from 
mere comity and courtesy in that nations do not undertake the courtesies that 
they extend to other nations out of a sense of legal obligation.18  Unlike 
international agreements, customary international law may bind states even 
though they have not formally agreed to be bound, unless they clearly and 
persistently object to the emerging custom as it develops.19  Customary 
international law is thus not necessarily written down, and therefore states 
may still be bound by a treaty or convention even though they have not 
become signatories to that treaty if the content of the treaty has achieved 
                                                 
 
11
  See Statute of the International Court of Justice Art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 
993, 3 Bevans 1179; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. 
 
12
  See COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[1]. 
 
13
  U.N. Charter. 
 
14
  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 
15
  INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS—A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 70 (Jeffrey 
L. Dunoff et al. eds., 2002). 
 
16
  See RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 102(2); Bayefsky & Fitzpatrick, supra note 3, at 3. 
 
17
  See RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 702. 
 
18
  See COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[1]. 
 
19
  RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 102 cmt. c. 
FEBRUARY 2006                 USING INTERNATIONAL LAW MORE EFFECTIVELY 305 
 
customary international law status.20  This is a crucial gap-filling function of 
international customary law given that international agreements cannot hope 
to cover all necessary relations between nations and other subjects of 
international law.21  But customary international law is only binding once it 
has fully emerged, or “crystallized,” a hard-to-define status achieved only 
when a majority of states recognize it as law.22 
 Evidence of norms that have ripened into fully crystallized rules of 
customary international law derives from a number of sources.  Fundamental 
to proving the existence of a customary international law principle is proof 
of state practice and accompanying proof that this state practice was 
undertaken out of a sense of legal obligation.23  Examples include official 
state documents, submissions to international negotiation or policy bodies, 
or other indications of governmental action.24  Additional sources of 
evidence for determining what constitutes customary international law 
include the judgments and opinions of international judicial and arbitral 
tribunals; judgments and opinions of national judicial tribunals; diplomatic 
statements; national legislation; treaties between other parties; declarations, 
resolutions, or statements of principle; and the writings of scholars 
documenting proof of customary international law.25 
Although determining what norms have crystallized and achieved the 
status of customary international law is often difficult, rules of customary 
international law are binding against nations and other subjects of 
                                                 
 
20
  INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS—A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH, supra note 
15, at 80. 
 
21
  See INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS LAW AND POLICY 56 (Paul B. Stephan et al. eds., 
3d ed. 2004). 
 
22
  INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS—A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH, supra note 
15.  For an example of a domestic court finding a principle of customary international law to be fully 
crystallized and therefore dispositive of the matter before it, see the foundational U.S. case, The Paquete 
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 708 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and 
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending 
upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no 
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of 
civilized nations . . . . This review of the precedents and authorities on the subject appears to us abundantly 
to demonstrate that at the present day, by the general consent of the civilized nations of the world, and 
independently of any express treaty or other public act, it is an established rule of international law, 
founded on considerations of humanity to a poor and industrious order of men, and of the mutual 
convenience of belligerent States, that coast fishing vessels, with their implements and supplies, cargoes 
and crews, unarmed, and honestly pursuing their peaceful calling of catching and bringing in fresh fish, are 
exempt from capture as prizes of war.”). 
 
23
  See RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 103 cmt. a. 
 
24
  See id. 
 
25
  See RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 103(2); Craig Allen, Lecture to International Law Class at the 
University of Washington School of Law (Oct. 4, 2004) (copy on file with the Pacific Rim Law & Pol’y 
Journal). 
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international law both at the international level and frequently in the 
domestic courts of the many nations themselves.26  This is true of the United 
States and Australia where rules of customary international law are 
applicable to certain actions before their respective national courts.27  Thus, 
even though Australia and the United States may not be signatories to 
certain international agreements governing a particular standard, or even if 
there are no international agreements in relation to this standard in the first 
place, this does not mean that the domestic courts of Australia and the 
United States will ignore this standard.28  Indeed, these courts may, in 
particular situations, deem these standards to be persuasive, or perhaps even 
fully enforceable,29 as rules of customary international law.30 
 
B.  The Emergence of a Distinct Customary International Law Gives 
Favorable Content to Indigenous Peoples’ Rights 
 
 Emerging international indigenous rights norms have been 
promulgated and articulated through three interrelated and mutually 
reinforcing processes:  (1) interpretation of existing international law in a 
way favorable to indigenous peoples’ aspirations; (2) promulgation of new 
international instruments specifically focused on indigenous peoples’ rights; 
and (3) successful litigation before international bodies resulting in decisions 
that have given further favorable content to indigenous peoples’ rights.31  
Indigenous peoples themselves have been at the forefront of these processes, 
which explains in large part the relative success obtained.32  In addition, 
numerous jurists and commentators have given further content to the body of 
emerging indigenous rights norms.33 
 
 
                                                 
 
26
  See COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[1]. 
 
27
  See e.g., Bayefsky & Fitzpatrick, supra note 3, at 3-41 (evaluating when customary international 
human rights law may achieve persuasive and direct enforceability in U.S. courts); Michael Legg, 
Indigenous Australians and International Law: Racial Discrimination, Genocide and Reparations, 20 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 387, 392-93 (2002). 
 
28
  See COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[1]. 
 
29
  See id.  
 
30
  The full impact of this reality for the enforceability of indigenous rights norms is explored in 
greater detail infra and represents the point of departure for the policy recommendations of this Comment.  
But first we turn to an examination of which of these indigenous rights norms have crystallized into 
customary international law. 
 
31
 See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 61-72. 
 
32
  See Note, supra note 3, at 1756. 
 
33
  See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 61-72. 
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1.  Primary Existing International Law Instruments Are Favorably 
Interpreted to Support Indigenous Peoples’ Rights 
 
 The primary existing international law instruments that have been 
favorably reinterpreted to support indigenous peoples’ rights include the 
U.N. Charter,34 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“Universal 
Declaration”),35 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”),36 the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination (“ICERD”),37 and the American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man (“American Declaration”).38  The U.N. Charter 
established two underlying general principles that serve as the foundation for 
much of the content of contemporary indigenous rights discourse:39  the right 
of self-determination for all peoples and the duty of all states to promote 
human rights, including the right to be free of discrimination on the basis of 
race, sex, language, or religion.40  The Universal Declaration and the 
American Declaration build on these concepts.  Though they are not legally 
binding documents,41 they are clear statements of an international consensus 
on human rights norms, and as such have been effectively used by 
indigenous rights advocates as evidence of customary international law 
favorable to indigenous rights claims.42 
 Indigenous rights advocates have been particularly effective in 
employing the ICCPR and the ICERD.43  Article 27 of the ICCPR 
guarantees that persons belonging to “ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities” within a nation “shall not be denied the right, in community with 
the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and 
                                                 
 
34
  U.N. Charter, supra note 13. 
 
35
  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, December 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217, reprinted in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW SELECTED DOCUMENTS 409 (Barry E. Carter et al. eds., 2003). 
 
36
  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
(adopted by the U.N. General Assembly at New York on December 16, 1966; entered into force on March 
23, 1976; ratified by the U.S. on June 8, 1992) [hereinafter ICCPR], reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW 
SELECTED DOCUMENTS 415 (Barry E. Carter et al. eds., 2003). 
 
37
  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 5 I.L.M. 352 
(1966) (done at New York on January 7, 1966; entered into force on January 4, 1969), reprinted in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW SELECTED DOCUMENTS 452 (Barry E. Carter et al. eds., 2003). 
 
38
  The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, reprinted in INTER-AMERICAN 
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-
AMERICAN SYSTEM 3 (2001). 
 
39
  See COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[2][a]. 
 
40
  U.N. Charter, supra note 13. 
 
41
  See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 
42
  See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980). Several decisions in which 
indigenous rights’ advocates have effectively utilized these international documents in advancing their 
claims are examined in detail infra, Part II.C. 
 
43
  See COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[2][c]-[d]. 
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practice their own religion, or to use their own language.”44  Article 27 has 
been successfully employed by indigenous peoples in various international 
fora to limit the intrusions of national government into areas of indigenous 
sovereignty.45  Likewise, ICERD’s prohibition on racially detrimental 
governmental policies has been used by indigenous rights advocates to 
substantially alter offending national government policies.46 
 
2.  Three International Law Instruments Specifically Address  
 Indigenous Rights 
 
 Three central documents that specifically address the rights and place 
of indigenous peoples in the world and within their surrounding nation states 
have emerged in the last two decades, giving the most specific content to the 
emerging body of indigenous rights norms.  These are the U.N. Working 
Group on Indigenous Population’s (“Working Group”) Draft Declaration of 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“DDRIP”),47 the International Labour 
Organization’s Convention No. 169 of 1989 (“ILO Convention No. 169”),48 
and the Organization of American State’s (“OAS”) American Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“ADRIP”).49   
Only the ILO Convention No. 169 has actually achieved the status of 
enforceable law, and is therefore the single binding international treaty 
specifically focused on indigenous rights currently in place in international 
                                                 
 
44
  ICCPR, supra note 36, Art. 27, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW SELECTED DOCUMENTS 415 
(Barry E. Carter et al. eds., 2003). 
 
45
  See COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[2][c] (citing Bernard Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band 
v. Canada, Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. A/45/40, vol. II, annex IX (A) (1990) 
(concluding that Canada violated Art. 27 of the ICCPR by allowing the government of Alberta to grant 
leases for oil and gas exploration within the aboriginal territory of the Lubicon Lake Band); Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights of a Segment of the Nicaraguan 
Population of Miskito Origin and Resolution on the Friendly Settlement Procedure Regarding the Human 
Rights Situation of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of Miskito Origin, O.A.S. Doc. 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.62, doc. 10, rev. 3 (1983), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.62, doc. 26 (1984) (Case No. 7964 (Nicaragua) 
(concluding that the special legal protection accorded indigenous peoples as a result of Art. 27 extends to 
the aspects linked to productive organization, which includes, among other things, the issue of ancestral 
and communal lands)). 
 
46
  See COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[2][c] (citing Mabo v. Queensland (1988) 166 C.L.R. 186, 214-19 
(Mabo I) (concluding that a state statute which attempted to eliminate, without compensation, aboriginal 
title to lands in the state is inconsistent with provisions of the Racial Discrimination Act of 1975, which 
implemented Art. 5 of the ICERD)). 
 
47
  Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, E.S.C. Res. 1994/45, U.N. 
ESCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (1994). 
 
48
  Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 
27, 1989, Int’l Labour Conference, 28 I.L.M. 1382 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991). 
 
49
  See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report of the Commission 1995, 
OEA/Ser.L./V./II.91, Doc. 7, Feb. 28, 1996; Osvaldo Kreimer, The Beginnings of the Inter-American 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 271, 272 & 274 n.7 (1996). 
FEBRUARY 2006                 USING INTERNATIONAL LAW MORE EFFECTIVELY 309 
 
law.50  ILO Convention No. 169 abandons the ILO’s former assimilationist 
posture toward indigenous peoples, and instead affirms indigenous peoples’ 
aspirations to land and natural resource rights, rights to be free from 
discrimination in national social policies, and, most importantly, the right to 
cultural integrity.51 The OAS’s ADRIP, which has yet to be fully ratified, 
articulates a similar vision for indigenous rights.52  The most aspirational 
document, but the one with the most potential to work a fundamental 
redefinition of indigenous people’s place in the world, is the U.N. Working 
Group’s DDRIP, which goes well beyond Convention No. 169 in its 
conception of and solicitude for indigenous rights.53  Taken together, these 
documents provide the clearest documentary evidence of the emerging 
customary international law of indigenous peoples’ rights. 
 
3.   Decisions from International Fora Bolster Indigenous Peoples’ Rights 
 
 Several cases before international fora have provided substantial 
content to the emerging collection of international norms regarding 
indigenous peoples’ rights.  Cases before the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights and U.N Human Rights Committee have been of 
particular significance.54  In general, these cases have probed the central 
indigenous rights norms of self-determination, cultural integrity and land 
ownership and use issues.55 
 
4.  Academic and Practitioner Delineation of Emerging International 
Indigenous Rights Provides Further Recognition 
 
 Finally, there have been numerous commentators whose works have 
chronicled the emerging international indigenous rights body of norms.  
Perhaps the most thorough and poignant commentator has been Professor S. 
James Anaya.  Professor Anaya’s seminal work, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, not only chronicles and analyzes these new trends, but 
also claims that much of this unruly but quickly growing body of indigenous 
                                                 
 
50
  See COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[2][a]. 
 
51
  See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 58-60. 
 
52
  See Kreimer, supra note 49, at 272, 274 n.7. 
 
53
  See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 64-65 (discussing how the DDRIP goes further than the ILO 
Convention No. 169). 
 
54
  See COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[3][a]-[b]. 
 
55
  See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 110-15, 131-41, 141-48 (examining cases pertaining to each of these 
subject areas before both courts).  Many of these decisions are examined in detail infra, Part II.C. 
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rights norms has largely achieved the status of customary international law.56  
Professor Anaya’s conclusion may be too sanguine when viewed from the 
perspective of national courts.57  Nevertheless, it is clear that even if “the 
specific contours of these norms are still evolving and remain somewhat 
ambiguous,” customary international law is taking “shape around a certain 
consensus of what counts as legitimate in relation to indigenous peoples.”58 
 
C.  The Twin Norms Underlying Cultural Sovereignty:  “Internal” Self-
Determination and Cultural Integrity as Customary International Law 
 
 Two central, foundational norms underlie the burgeoning body of 
international indigenous rights to cultural sovereignty:  the right of 
indigenous peoples to “internal” self-determination and cultural integrity.59  
Arguably these two norms have achieved customary international law status 
and represent the firmest edge of this new area of the law.60   
 
1.   “Internal” Self-Determination Is a Means for Indigenous Peoples to 
Achieve Greater Self-Management and Autonomy 
 
 The generally recognized right of “peoples” to self-determination 
must be distinguished from the emerging right of indigenous peoples to 
“internal” self-determination.  The right of all “peoples” to self-
determination is proclaimed in the U.N. Charter61 and other treaties,62 and 
most international jurists consider it to be a strong customary norm.63  
However, the extent to which this full conception of self-determination 
applies to indigenous peoples is still very much in flux.64  Full self-
determination involves both political freedom and the right of peoples to 
                                                 
 
56
  ANAYA, supra note 1, at 72 (undertaking an exhaustive review of international treaties, tribunal 
decisions and submissions of national delegations to international fora before drawing the conclusion that 
much of the emerging body of indigenous rights norms has achieved the status of binding customary 
international law). 
 
57
  See id. For example, his heavy reliance on the developments of international courts will likely 
cause domestic courts to view his conclusions with skepticism: after all, international fora often reach 
results decidedly divergent from domestic determinations. 
 
58
  Id. 
 
59
 See id. at 97-128, 131-41. 
 
60
  Id. at 112, 137. 
 
61
  U.N. Charter, supra note 13, Art. 1. 
 
62
  See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 36, Art. 27, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW SELECTED 
DOCUMENTS 415 (Barry E. Carter et al. eds., 2003). 
 
63
  See Note, supra note 3, at 1757-58. 
 
64
  See COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[3][a]. 
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preserve their cultural, ethnic, historical, and territorial identity.65  As such, 
full self-determination often brings independent statehood.66  Indeed, the 
worry that the right to self-determination allows a people to secede from the 
nation-state in which they reside has been the principle road-block to the 
extension of self-determination status to indigenous peoples.67  The U.N. 
Working Group’s DDRIP is currently stalled on precisely this issue.68 
 In contrast, a more limited idea of self-determination—a concept that 
may be termed “internal” self-determination—has the potential to resolve 
this tension.69  The content and nature of “internal” self-determination was 
succinctly described by the Australian contribution to the DDRIP 
formulation debate:  “[Indigenous] peoples are seeking to assert their 
identities, to preserve their languages, cultures, and traditions and to achieve 
greater self-management and autonomy, free from undue interference from 
central governments.”70  In addition, “internal” self-determination should be 
seen as a collective or group right as opposed to an individual right.71  And, 
as Professor Anaya has persuasively argued, “internal” self-determination 
should be seen as sui generis72 to indigenous peoples, as it is remedial in 
nature given that it is in some sense a compensation for the specific colonial 
encounter experienced by indigenous peoples, an encounter which stripped 
them of their most cherished rights wholesale.73 
 In fact, this seems to be the direction in which negotiations around 
DDRIP are headed.74  Both Australia and the United States have signaled 
                                                 
 
65
  See id.; Hurst Hannum, The Right of Self-Determination in the Twenty-First Century: Symposium 
on the Future of International Human Rights, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 773, 773-775 (1998). 
 
66
  See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 102. 
 
67
 See Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative and 
International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57, 116-20 (1999).  
 
68
  See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 110. 
 
69
  See id. at 111-12. 
 
70
  Australian Government Delegation, Speaking Notes on Self-Determination, at 2 (July 24, 1991). 
 
71
 See Kitok v. Sweden, Communication No. 197/1985, Report of the Human Rights Committee, 
U.N. GOAR, 43rd Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 207, U.N. Doc. A/43/40, annex 7 (G) (July 27, 1988) (holding 
that the group cultural rights of the Sami indigenous peoples in Sweden take precedence over the individual 
claim of one of its members when the viability and the welfare of Sami culture was threatened); cf. 
Lovelace v. Canada, Communication No. 24/1977, Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GOAR, 
36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/36/40, annex 18 (July 30, 1981) (upholding the right of the 
individual to access their indigenous culture: “the right of Sandra Lovelace to have access to her native 
culture and language ‘in community with the other members’ of her group, has in fact been, and continues 
to be interfered with . . . .”). 
 
72
  “Sui generis” is defined as: “Of its own kind, peculiar, for example, a statutory proceeding for 
declaratory judgment, neither legal nor equitable.” BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (1969). 
 
73
  See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 110.  Importantly, Professor Anaya is clear that “internal” self-
determination should be seen as an inherent right held by indigenous peoples.  It is the recognition of this 
right that is “compensatory” on the part of the former colonial powers, not the right itself. 
 
74
 See id. at 111-12. 
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their approval of self-determination language in the DDRIP, but only if it is 
to be understood in its more limited “internal” self-determination sense.75 
 A brief examination of the Miskito Case76 demonstrates the concrete 
application and interaction of these principles.  In the Miskito Case, the 
peoples of the Atlantic coast region of Nicaragua took their longstanding 
claim to independence from the central Nicaraguan government to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights.77  This case, the sole international 
case to directly address whether indigenous peoples qualify for full self-
determination status, clearly held that they did not.78  However, the second 
holding in the Miskito Case can arguably be seen as an endorsement of 
“internal” self-determination for the Miskito coast indigenous peoples, 
resolving that these peoples deserved autonomy in ruling their own affairs 
and demanding a new political order reflecting this principle.79  In short, the 
Miskito Case rejected full self-determination for indigenous peoples but 
extended to them the right to “internal” self-determination in its place.80 
 As the foregoing demonstrates, the concept of full self-determination 
for indigenous peoples is fraught with irresolvable conflicts of interest and 
unlikely to ever materialize as an enforceable right in international law.  
Nation-states are simply unwilling to relinquish overall sovereignty within 
their existing borders (and most indigenous peoples have not expressed a 
strong desire for control over a fully independent nation).81  However, the 
concept of “internal” self-determination seems to address concerns on all 
sides of the issue:  it maintains the territorial integrity and underlying 
sovereignty of existing nation states while at the same time ensuring that 
indigenous peoples have a palatable measure of control over their own 
affairs, natural resources, and culture.  In essence, it enables a workable 
consensus, and a workable consensus is often the underlying core that 
achieves the status of fully binding customary international law.  Indeed, as 
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  See id. 
 
76
  The Miskito Case, Case 7964, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.62, doc. 10 rev. 3 (1983); 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.62, doc 26 (1984).  
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  See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 114. 
 
78
  The Miskito Case, Inter-Am. C.H.R. at 78-81. 
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  Id. at 81-82. 
 
80
  In a case similar to the Miskito Case, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, in 
considering the plight of the Awas Tingni indigenous peoples, further advocated for the extension of 
“internal” self-determination to indigenous peoples when it ordered Nicaragua to “create an effective 
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13, 2005). 
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  See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 110-111. 
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the Miskito Case demonstrates, “internal” self-determination for indigenous 
peoples may have already achieved customary international law status.82 
 
2.   Cultural Integrity Has Achieved the Status of Binding Customary 
International Law 
 
 The right to cultural integrity is fundamentally the right of indigenous 
people to assert their identity through the unimpeded use of their own 
language, religion, and other distinctive cultural practices.83  A corollary 
right is the right of protection for their culturally sacred sites within the 
surrounding nation state.84  There is also a remedial flavor to the protection 
of indigenous cultural integrity:  given the attempts by many nation states to 
obliterate indigenous culture through the colonial encounter and continuing 
assimilationist policies, they are now under an obligation to protect these 
same indigenous cultures.85  This implies that there is an affirmative duty on 
the part of nation states to protect indigenous cultural integrity.86  As 
Professor Anaya has argued:  “[T]he cultural integrity norm has developed 
to entitle indigenous groups to affirmative measures to remedy the past 
undermining of their cultural survival and to guard against continuing threats 
in this regard . . . .”87 
 Two cases before international fora reinforce these points.  In the 
Ominayak Case,88 the U.N. Human Rights Committee found that, in light of 
“historical inequities,” Canada had violated the Lubicon Lake Band’s right 
to cultural integrity under Article 27 of the ICCPR when it allowed the 
Province of Alberta to expropriate the tribe’s land for private oil, gas, and 
timber exploration.89  In the Yanomami Case,90 the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights also relied on Article 27 of the ICCPR and 
held that “international law in its present state . . . recognizes the right of 
                                                 
 
82
  See id. at 112. 
 
83
  However, at the same time, the Human Rights Committee has also instructed that rights of cultural 
integrity are not absolute when confronted with the interests of society as a whole.  See Lansman v. 
Finland, Communication No. 511/1992, Human Rights Committee, 52nd Sess., U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (Oct. 26, 1994). 
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  See Note, supra note 3, at 1760. 
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  See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 139. 
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  See id. 
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  See id. 
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  Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. A/45/40, vol. 
II, annex IX (A) (Mar. 26, 1990). 
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  Id. at ¶ 2.3. 
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  Yanomami Case, Case No. 7615 (Brazil), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Res. No. 12/85 (Mar. 5, 1985), 
Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1984-1985, O.A.S. Doc. 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66, doc. 10 rev. 1, at 24 (1985). 
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ethnic groups to special protection on their use of their own language, for the 
practice of their own religion, and, in general, for all those characteristics 
necessary for the preservation of their cultural identity.”91  The Commission 
held that the numerous incursions, sanctioned by the Brazilian government, 
into the Yanomami ancestral lands threatened the Yanomami’s Article 27-
protected culture and traditions.92  These two cases underline the affirmative 
duty of nations to protect indigenous peoples’ right to cultural integrity and 
the role that respect for land rights plays in protecting that right.   
 The Yanomami decision is of particular significance because Brazil 
was not a signatory to the ICCPR at the time of the decision, indicating that 
the case’s holding, and the general principle of the right to cultural integrity 
for indigenous peoples on which it rests, has achieved the status of 
customary international law.93  Supporting this argument is the fact that the 
cultural integrity norm is perhaps the norm that has been most consistently 
applied to indigenous peoples.94  The cultural rights provisions of the ICCPR 
(Art. 27) and ILO Convention No. 169 have both been continuously 
referenced and relied upon in international fora to protect indigenous 
cultural integrity.95  In addition, the U.N. Working Group’s DDRIP has the 
protection of indigenous people’s cultural integrity as one of its central 
underlying principles for prospective application.96  Finally, numerous 
statements by national governments before various international fora 
demonstrate state acceptance of this norm and state recognition of the 
obligation to enforce it.97  Taken all together, there is persuasive evidence 
that the right of indigenous people to the protection of their cultural integrity 
has fully crystallized and achieved the status of binding customary 
international law. 
 As the preceding sections have demonstrated, the twin norms of 
cultural integrity and “internal” self-determination have arguably achieved 
the status of full customary law in the guise of a right to “cultural 
sovereignty.”  The enforcement of this crystallizing norm, however, is 
decidedly unsettled.98 
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  Id. at 24, 31.  
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  Id. at 24. 
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  See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 134. 
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  See id. at 131-41. 
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  See id. at 132-37. 
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III.   ENFORCING THE CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 
 
 Indigenous peoples have achieved remarkable success at the 
international level in creating a body of international norms highly favorable 
to the assertion of their rights.  At least two of these norms – the right to 
“internal” self-determination and the right to cultural integrity – have 
arguably crystallized into binding customary international law.  And yet, 
indigenous peoples have struggled to enforce this customary law at the local 
level where it can have the greatest impact in their actual daily lives.  This is 
particularly true of Australia and the United States, where the recent cases of 
Kartinyeri v. The Commonwealth99 and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Ass’n100 demonstrate the resistance of these countries’ domestic 
courts to enforcing internationally derived customary law favorable to 
indigenous rights when that customary law collides with contrary domestic 
law principles.  A strategy for effective enforcement at the domestic level of 
the hard-won gains achieved by indigenous peoples at the international level 
is required.  Given the lack of an overarching binding treaty schema 
governing indigenous peoples’ rights in international law,101 and given the 
large body of highly favorable customary law discussed in Part II, this 
section focuses on developing a strategy for the enforcement of customary, 
as opposed to treaty-based, international law. 
 
A.   Domestic Enforcement of Indigenous Rights Is Superior to 
International Enforcement of Indigenous Rights 
 
 The current international legal structure built upon the twin precepts 
of state sovereignty and non-intervention in internal state affairs is 
inherently resistant to supranational interference within national 
boundaries.102  A strategy for enforcing customary international laws of 
indigenous peoples’ rights in domestic courts must overcome this inherently 
resistant structure.103  There are two choices available to overcome these 
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  Kartinyeri v. The Commonwealth (1998) 195 C.L.R. 337. 
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  Lyng v. NW Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
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  See Anaya, supra note 4, at 191. 
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 Id. at 1460.  The Dann sisters, Mary and Carrie Dann, unable to adequately prosecute their land 
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systemic barriers to enforcement.  One seeks to invade state sovereignty 
“from above” by seeking judgments in international fora and then attempting 
to enforce these judgments against nation states in domestic courts.104  The 
contemporary human rights regime often utilizes this method.105  The second 
attempts to gain judgment and enforcement in the domestic courts of the 
nation-state itself.106 
 The first “international option” is plagued by difficulties in gaining 
actual enforcement of the judgment107 and sets up an adversarial regime 
pitting international bodies against domestic constituencies and 
institutions.108  In the absence of a binding treaty schema, such as the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”) structure, domestic pressures are likely to 
consistently overwhelm international pressures because domestic branches 
of government are more closely accountable to domestic constituencies.109  
In addition, few things inspire fiercer resistance to outside pressure in 
domestic affairs than the perceived loss of sovereignty that attaches to the 
domestic enforcement of international rulings.110  The volatile domestic 
reactions to WTO rulings impinging on national sovereignty are powerful 
demonstrations of this fact.111  These negative aspects of the “international 
option” are especially pronounced when it comes to enforcing indigenous 
peoples’ rights, as such enforcement often entails perceived losses by 
competing domestic constituencies.  The Dann Sisters Case clearly 
demonstrates the failings of the “international option” on this front.112 
 The second “domestic option,” though not without its problems, 
presents a much better avenue for indigenous peoples wishing to enforce 
favorable international custom at the local level.  Though it is often harder 
                                                                                                                                               
where they received a judgment in their favor.  To date, they have been unable to enforce this judgment in 
U.S. courts. 
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 See Helene Cooper, Waves of Protest Disrupt WTO Meeting, WALL ST. J.,  Dec. 1, 1999, at A2. 
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for indigenous peoples to win favorable judgments in domestic fora,113 the 
benefits of using domestic courts over international fora are readily apparent.  
By choosing domestic courts to advance their claims, indigenous peoples 
involve the domestic court as a participant in resolving the dispute.114  This, 
in turn, alleviates the perception that judgments are being imposed from the 
outside, significantly ameliorating possible domestic nationalist resistance to 
enforcement.  In addition, the domestic option involves the domestic courts 
in the process of developing precepts of emerging international law.115  This 
further reduces tension and contradicts the perception that international law 
is created by outsiders beyond the control of any domestic interests.116  As 
well, the involvement of domestic courts in the resolution of indigenous 
rights claims accelerates the process of “norm internalization” whereby 
domestic actors begin to align their actions with prevailing international 
norms – in this case, indigenous rights norms – because they themselves 
have come to believe in them.117  Full norm internalization represents total 
enforcement of a given norm and would represent the best possible 
outcome.118  Notably, the process of norm internalization is advanced even 
when a party to a case loses that specific case.  As long as that party asserts 
their desired norm, the process of norm internalization is advanced simply 
through exposure in the domestic courts.  Finally, domestic courts have the 
direct power to enforce their own decrees, in contrast to the international 
fora available to indigenous peoples wishing to advance their rights.119 
 In sum, the “domestic option” is the best avenue for indigenous 
peoples wishing to secure and advance their claims if they are able to 
convince domestic courts to employ the highly favorable body of emerging 
customary law discussed in Part II.  This is a big “if” and has dissuaded 
many indigenous peoples from choosing this option.120  The most effective 
way to get domestic courts to apply this favorable indigenous rights 
customary law is the subject of the following two sections. 
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B.  Direct Enforcement of Customary International Law in Australian 
and U.S.  Courts Is Alluring, but Ultimately Frustrating 
 
 Direct enforcement of customary international law in the domestic 
courts of Australia and the United States appears on first glance to be quite 
alluring.121  For instance, in U.S. courts customary international law is 
considered federal common law and is enforceable to the same extent as all 
other federal common law.122 Subsequent acts of Congress must be 
construed so as not to conflict with customary law,123 and, as federal 
common law, customary international law is meant to preempt any 
conflicting state law.124   
 A similar situation exists in Australia.  Although there is much less 
case law on the subject than in the United States, the recent Mabo v. 
Queensland125 and Nulyarimma v. Thompson126 Australian High Court 
decisions establish in dicta that customary international law is part of the 
Australian common law with similar resulting implications.127 
However, the potential negatives of directly enforcing customary law 
in Australian and U.S. courts overwhelm the potential positives of 
employing such a strategy and demonstrate that another method for 
enforcing indigenous rights customary law must be formulated.  First of all, 
the threshold for what rules of customary international law may be directly 
enforced in domestic courts is strict:  only norms that have achieved fully 
crystallized customary international law status will qualify.128  This 
eliminates many indigenous rights norms that have yet to achieve this status.  
 This underlines a second major constraint in attempting to directly 
enforce international customary law in domestic courts:  what has attained 
the status of a fully crystallized rule of customary law is decidedly difficult 
to determine.129  Because U.S. and Australian domestic courts are already 
predisposed against recognizing indigenous peoples’ claims, such 
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indeterminacy is too easily exploited to preclude application of “close” 
customary norms.   
Thirdly, because of the persistent objector exception to the 
enforcement of customary international law, rules of customary law 
consistently disputed by the United States or Australia may not be applied 
by their respective courts.130   
Finally, and perhaps most dispositive of this debate, even if there is a 
clear rule of binding customary international law, this rule may not provide a 
cause of action in U.S.131 or Australian132 domestic courts.  Instead, 
international custom may only provide a rule of decision that U.S.133 or 
Australian134 courts can apply when a cause of action comes before the court 
from some other source.135 
 Direct enforcement of indigenous customary international law rights 
in the domestic courts of Australia and the U.S. is alluring, but ultimately 
likely to be a frustrating option.  If such an option is available, indigenous 
peoples and their advocates should seize the opportunity, as it provides for 
robust enforcement and advancement of indigenous rights.  However, as 
demonstrated above, such opportunities are likely to be minimal.  That 
leaves a final method for the enforcement of highly favorable indigenous 
peoples’ rights customary international law:  “soft” enforcement of 
customary international law. 
 
C.  “Soft” Enforcement of Customary International Law Acts as an 
Interpretive Guide in Australian and U.S.  Courts 
 
 Even when customary international law rules cannot be directly 
enforced in domestic courts, they can still have a powerful impact on the 
                                                 
 
130
  See THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & HAROLD G. MAIER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 
24 (1985) (defining the “persistent objector exception” as the ability of countries that have consistently 
refused to apply an emerging principle of customary international law to subsequently refuse to enforce that 
rule when it has fully crystallized and is mandatorily enforceable against all other countries who have not 
themselves persistently objected to its enforcement in their territory). 
 
131
  See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring); 
see also Sosa, 542 U.S. at 723 (2004) (holding that neither the Federal Tort Claims Act nor the Alien Tort 
Statute provided a remedy for a Mexican alien unlawfully abducted from Mexico and arrested in the United 
States). 
 
132
  See Mitchell, supra note 127, at 32 (describing the international crime of genocide, and 
considering Australia's response to its international obligations regarding genocide in the context of its 
implementation of international human rights generally, and in light of Nulyarimma v. Thompson 
specifically). 
 
133
  See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 819 (Bork, J., concurring); Sosa, 542 U.S. at 723 (2004). 
 
134
  See Mitchell, supra note 127, at 32. 
 
135
  This will be further addressed in Part III.C, infra. 
320 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 15 NO. 1 
 
shape of domestic law and can achieve a degree of enforcement in the daily 
lives of indigenous peoples at the local level.  This is because the emerging 
body of international indigenous rights customary rules can still be “softly” 
enforced in domestic courts; that is, they can be used as persuasive authority 
and as an interpretive guide in matters before these courts.136  In other 
words, instead of providing a cause of action, indigenous rights norms can 
provide a rule of decision in Australian and U.S. courts.137  Additionally, 
given that indigenous peoples’ law in Australia and the United States was 
itself founded on principles of international law, Australian and U.S. 
domestic courts should be required to consider contemporary international 
law regarding indigenous peoples in reaching decisions affecting indigenous 
peoples within their borders.138  Finally, given that Australian and U.S. 
domestic courts have recently demonstrated a willingness to consider 
international and comparative law principles in reaching their own domestic 
decisions139 despite earlier reluctance, the time is right for indigenous 
peoples to advance their claims through “soft” enforcement of favorable 
international custom. 
 
1.   Australian and U.S. Courts Are Increasingly Open to International 
Precedent 
 
 The highest courts of both Australia and the United States have 
recently demonstrated a willingness to consider precedent from beyond their 
respective borders as persuasive authority and as a guide to interpreting their 
own domestic law.140  For example, the Mabo v. Queensland decision in 
Australia cited decisions from the United States, Canada, and New Zealand, 
as well as principles of international law.141  The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Roper v. Simmons likewise cited both comparative and 
international law as persuasive authority in deciding that the execution of 
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juveniles is unconstitutional.142  This posture toward persuasive authority 
originating beyond the domestic borders of Australia and the United States 
opens the door to employing the “soft” enforcement strategy for 
internationally derived indigenous rights norms discussed in the next 
section. 
 
2.  Indigenous Rights Customary International Law Should Be Used as 
Persuasive Authority and as an Interpretive Guide in Australian and 
U.S. Domestic Courts 
 
 In common law systems such as Australia and the United States, 
international customary law can and should provide a logical framework of 
principles for indigenous rights. In both countries, the judiciary has been 
active in both interpreting statutory or constitutional law concerning 
indigenous peoples and in developing supplemental (if not foundational) 
legal doctrine in the common law tradition.143  This is especially true where 
the issue of indigenous law before those courts is indeterminate.144  In such 
cases, international customary law should be used as highly persuasive 
authority.145  
 In the United States, such a structure is enabled by the already 
established statutory interpretive rule that federal law should comport with 
international law norms wherever possible146 and by the resulting reliance of 
U.S. courts upon international law norms in interpreting state and federal 
statutes and constitutional provisions.147  In Australia, this approach to using 
international indigenous rights norms is more fully developed and 
exemplified by the recent Mabo v. Queensland decision.148  Justice Brennan, 
in announcing the leading opinion of the court, stated:  “The common law 
does not necessarily conform with international law, but international law is 
a legitimate and important influence on the development of the common law 
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especially when international law declares the existence of universal human 
rights.”149 
 In sum, emerging indigenous rights customary international law may 
not provide a cause of action for indigenous peoples’ claims before domestic 
courts or prove to be binding authority in these courts’ determinations.  
Nevertheless, it can provide interpretive guidance as persuasive authority 
thereby providing a rule of decision to domestic courts.  This, in turn, can 
have a profound impact on domestic law, establishing key principles and 
adding content to domestic law based upon international principles favorable 
to indigenous peoples, and thereby translating these principles to the local 
level and to daily lives. 
 
3.   Consideration of Indigenous Rights Customary International Law by 
the Domestic Courts of Australia and the United States Is Not Merely 
Advisable, it Should Be Required Under Court Precedent 
 
 Despite the objections of some U.S. and Australian jurists, principles 
of international law should be particularly persuasive in these domestic 
courts because indigenous law in these countries originates from principles 
of international law.150 
 The Marshall trilogy151 of cases establishing the guiding principles of 
American Indian law in the United States introduced twin foundational 
concepts to this jurisprudence:  American Indian tribes were deemed to be 
“domestic dependent nations” with “inherent sovereignty.”152  In essence, 
this meant that tribes lacked most attributes of “external” sovereignty but 
retained the authority to govern their own internal affairs and territory.153  It 
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implied a relationship governed at least partially by principles of 
international law.154  Indeed, “treaties” were employed and American 
Indians were consistently treated as different in kind to other peoples on the 
American continent, for better and for worse.155  Accompanying less 
favorable doctrines also emerged to justify the displacement and subjugation 
of American Indians.156  Indeed, these doctrines have largely gained 
ascendancy especially under recent Supreme Court rulings; but the 
international law-based principles remain a fundamental part of doctrinal 
American Indian law.157   
 Likewise, Australian Aboriginal law is also based in significant part 
on principles of international law.158  The international law that existed at the 
time of the onset of colonialism in Australia recognized three effective ways 
for acquiring sovereignty over territory:  (1) conquest, (2) cession, and (3) 
occupation of territory that was terra nullius (uninhabited territory belonging 
to no one).159  In an amazing denial of reality, Australia was considered an 
occupation of terra nullius by its own government and courts.160  Of course, 
this meant that for much of Australia’s history, its indigenous peoples were 
not treated as limited sovereigns under Australian law, as was the case in the 
United States.161 Therefore, principles of international law were not 
employed in deriving their relationship to the emerging Australian nation.162  
However, this all changed with Mabo v. Queensland,163 a decision from 
Australia’s highest court that signaled a seismic shift in Australia’s approach 
to its indigenous peoples.164  Among other things, the Mabo decision, in 
                                                                                                                                               
authority to reach a claim against the on-reservation actions of State law enforcement officers who entered 
the Indian reservation to investigate an off-reservation crime). Cf. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 
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holding that Australian indigenous peoples did retain “native” title to their 
lands except where extinguished by the Crown, soundly rejected the terra 
nullius conceptualization.165  By doing this the Australian High Court 
essentially opened the door to developing a new relationship between the 
Australian government and indigenous peoples, finally recognizing the 
sovereignty of these peoples.166  Crucially, the Mabo opinion utilized 
international law to both open this door and to establish the first 
foundational principles that would govern this new conceptualization.167  In 
sum, though Australia and the United States have taken different pathways, 
both countries have arrived at a formulation of domestic indigenous peoples’ 
law that was created and is fundamentally based upon principles of 
international law. 
 Given that indigenous peoples’ law in both Australia and the United 
States has its origins in international law, contemporary principles of 
international law should have particularly persuasive power in Australian 
and U.S. courts applying this jurisprudence today.  As Philip P. Frickey 
argues in the context of U.S. law, “[i]f the only legitimate constitutional 
justification for an expansive federal power over Indian affairs lies in 
interpreting the Constitution against the backdrop of international law, then 
international law is an important framework for constitutional interpretation 
throughout the field of federal Indian law.”168   
 This does not mean that international law should be binding authority 
in U.S. and Australian courts adjudicating indigenous rights’ claims.169 
However, it does mean that international customary law of indigenous rights 
has a special place in U.S. and Australian domestic courts.  Specifically it 
should be mandatorily considered in U.S. and Australian courts as 
persuasive authority and as an equally valid source of law even when 
international precedent would not be considered in other similarly postured 
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non-indigenous rights contexts.170  This conclusion is based on the quid pro 
quo that Professor Frickey argues is required:  if Australian and U.S. 
domestic indigenous peoples’ law is built upon principles of international 
law, then international law should continue to inform new developments in 
this jurisprudence.171 
 Australia and the United States present the toughest and most 
revealing contexts in which to probe the nature and limits of enforcing 
international customary law of indigenous peoples’ rights.  Direct 
enforcement of emerging international indigenous rights norms is highly 
unlikely in both contexts.  This is true even of indigenous rights norms that 
have fully crystallized into binding rules of customary international law.  
However, even in these resistant jurisdictions, international law can be 
“softly” enforced at the domestic level by using emerging indigenous rights 
international customary law as persuasive authority, thereby providing not a 
cause of action, but a rule of decision for domestic courts.  In this way, 
“soft” enforcement is able to realize most of the benefits of direct 
enforcement in the actual lives of indigenous peoples on-the-ground.  It also 
allows for the use of indigenous rights norms before domestic courts that 
have not fully congealed into customary law, thereby expanding the amount 
of favorable precedent available to indigenous rights litigators.  Finally, 
utilizing a soft-enforcement strategy helps to crystallize still emerging 
indigenous rights norms reinforcing and accelerating the growth of this 
highly favorable international precedent.172 
 
IV.   APPLYING THE PRINCIPLES OF “SOFT” ENFORCEMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY INDIGENOUS RIGHTS ENABLES  
RECONSIDERATION OF LYNG AND KARTINYERI 
 
 Two recent judicial decisions from Australia and the United States, 
Kartinyeri v. The Commonwealth173 and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Association,174 provide an opportunity to evaluate the principle of 
“soft” enforcement as applied to the twin norms of cultural sovereignty:  
cultural integrity and “internal” self-determination. 
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A.  Kartinyeri v. The Commonwealth Would Have Been Decided 
Differently If the Emerging International Customary Law of Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights Had Been Considered 
 
 In Kartinyeri, a group of the indigenous Ngarrindjeri people sought to 
prevent the construction of a bridge—the Hindmarsh Island bridge—that 
they claimed would devastate a sacred area of cultural and spiritual 
importance to them.175  The Ngarrindjeri invoked the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Island Heritage Protection Act of 1984 (Cth)176 to protect this sacred 
site, which gave the relevant Minister power to make and enforce 
declarations meant to protect and preserve sensitive Aboriginal sites and 
objects.177  The Heritage Protection Act was in conflict with another act, 
however, the Hindmarsh Island Bridge Act of 1997,178 which prevented the 
Minister from declaring any Aboriginal areas surrounding the bridge 
construction site as sacred areas.179  The question presented to the Australian 
High Court was which act would control, and specifically whether the 
Bridge Act was invalid because it was not supported by any constitutionally 
enumerated power.180  The Court held that passage of the Bridge Act, and its 
resulting significant amendment of the Heritage Protection Act, was a valid 
exercise of power.181  According to the lead opinion, because the Parliament 
had the power to enact the Heritage Protection Act, it also had the power to 
amend and diminish the act:  “the power to make laws includes the power to 
unmake them . . . .”182 
 The central issue underpinning the dilemma before the Court was 
whether § 51(xxxvi) of the Australian Constitution183—colloquially referred 
to as the “race power”184—allowed race-based legislation that was 
disadvantageous to targeted groups or only provided for beneficial 
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legislation towards those groups.185  This issue had not been squarely 
considered by the court before.186  A majority of the court found that the race 
power was broad enough to authorize laws that operate either to the 
advantage or disadvantage of people of the particular targeted race.187  A 
slimmer majority went on to hold that this broad power controlled the issue 
before the court, and that the Bridge Act could constitutionally operate to the 
detriment of the Ngarrindjeri people.188  One opinion agreed with the broad 
reading of the race power,189 but argued that as applied to this situation, only 
a beneficial law would be “necessary” under the language of the race power 
clause.190  Justice Kirby, in dissent, argued that a 1967 amendment to the 
race power clause effectively created a gloss on this amendment that allowed 
only beneficial race-based legislation.191  Justice Kirby went on to state that, 
where the Constitution is ambiguous, the Court should adopt a meaning that 
conforms to principles of universal rights and that international law is a 
legitimate and persuasive source for determining these controlling universal 
principles.192  Justice Kirby then looked to principles of international law 
that prohibit detrimental distinctions on the basis of race to support his 
constitutional interpretation.193 
 Kartinyeri could have been decided differently by utilizing 
international customary law regarding indigenous peoples as persuasive 
authority in resolving the constitutional indeterminacy at the core of the 
case.  As Justice Kirby recognized, using principles of international law to 
resolve indeterminacy is a valid and effective approach to constitutional 
interpretation.194  Thus, the emerging customary international law of 
indigenous peoples’ rights can be brought to bear in resolving this 
indeterminacy.  And, as this Comment has argued, not only can it be brought 
to bear, it should be brought to bear given the unique foundational role that 
international law has played in formulating the law of indigenous peoples in 
both Australia and the United States.  Unfortunately, no Justice in Kartinyeri 
looked to the customary international law of indigenous peoples rights.195 
                                                 
 
185
  See Kartinyeri, 195 C.L.R. at 340. 
 
186
  Legg, supra note 27, at 395. 
 
187
  See Kartinyeri, 195 C.L.R. at 363 (Brennan, C.J., McHugh, J., Gummow, J., & Hayne, J.). 
 
188
  See id. at 340 (Gummow, J. & Hayne, J.) 
 
189
  See id. at 366 (Gaudron, J.). 
 
190
  See id. at 367 (Gaudron, J.). 
 
191
  See id. at 413 (Kirby, J.). 
 
192
  See id. at 417-19 (Kirby, J.). 
 
193
  See id. (Kirby, J.); Legg, supra note 27, at 397; see also Amelia Simpson & George Williams, 
International Law and Constitutional Interpretation, 11 PUB. L. REV. 205 (2000) (drawing the same 
conclusion). 
 
194
  See Kartinyeri, 195 C.L.R. at 417-19 (Kirby, J.); Legg, supra note 27, at 397. 
 
195
  See Legg, supra note 27, at 397. 
328 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 15 NO. 1 
 
 If the Kartinyeri Justices had considered this emerging customary law, 
Kartinyeri would have been decided differently.  First, the congealing 
customary law of “internal” self-determination for indigenous peoples would 
have prohibited the Bridge Act from curtailing certain provisions of the 
Heritage Protection Act that extended such internal self-determination to the 
Ngarrindjeri people.  Such a provision was at the heart of this case:  the right 
to aboriginal control over land that is considered to be a sacred site by the 
Ngarrindjeri.  In other words, at the most general level of analysis the 
“internal” self-determination would have resolved the indeterminacy of 
which act controlled in favor of the Heritage Protection Act because this act 
supported the “internal” self-determination norm, whereas the Bridge Act 
undermined it.  As well, the constitutional indeterminacy of whether the race 
power could be applied only in an advantageous way would have been 
resolved in favor of an exclusively advantageous reading, because such a 
reading would have been consistent with the emerging international custom 
of maintaining “internal” self-determination for the Ngarrindjeri people.  A 
contrary reading would have directly undermined this “internal” self-
determination.  Second, the norm of cultural integrity for indigenous peoples 
would have counseled for a constitutional reading of the race power 
forbidding legislation which disadvantaged aboriginal people by removing 
their access to territory considered sacred by them.  Though no justice took 
this approach to deciding the case, it is encouraging that at least one 
justice—Justice Kirby—recognized the validity of using principles of 
international law to resolve indeterminacy in local law.196  This is a positive 
sign that at least some members of the Australian High Court are open to 
“soft” enforcement of internationally derived indigenous rights. 
 
B.  Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association Would 
Have Been Decided Differently If the Emerging Customary 
International Law of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Had Been 
Considered 
 
 In Lyng, American Indian plaintiffs challenged a proposal by the U.S. 
Forest Service to build a road on public land in the Chimney Rock area of 
Northern California on the grounds that this road would destroy a sacred 
area essential to the practice of their religion, and one that the Indians had 
been using for generations.197  The district court held that the road-building 
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and the timbering that the road was being built for “would seriously damage 
the salient visual, aural, and environmental qualities of the high country” 
necessary for the practice of the Indian’s religion and therefore would 
violate the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution.198  The Ninth 
Circuit agreed.199  Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority of the Supreme 
Court, rejected the argument that the Indians’ right to religious freedom 
under the First Amendment was infringed by the road construction.200  
Justice O’Connor argued that American Indians have exactly the same First 
Amendment Free Exercise rights as everyone else,201 and that these rights do 
not include the ability to exert control over federal public lands.202 
 As in the Kartinyeri case, principles of customary international law of 
indigenous peoples’ rights, utilized as highly persuasive authority, would 
have counseled for a different outcome in Lyng.  “Soft” enforcement of these 
indigenous peoples’ rights would have entailed the application of this 
customary law as a highly persuasive interpretive guide in determining the 
content of the Free Exercise Clause in relation to American Indians.  First, 
the internationally derived “internal” self determination principle would 
have attacked the idea that American Indians’ religious rights are on equal 
footing with other religions in the United States.  The specific history giving 
content to the uniqueness of “internal” self determination would have itself 
pointed to a conclusion that recognized that American Indians should be 
accorded an extra measure of deference in determining what constitutes their 
religious practices and what is needed to sustain these practices.  This 
deference is due because of the unique limited sovereignty—termed 
“internal” self determination—accorded to indigenous peoples under 
international law, and indeed under U.S. law. 
 Secondly, the internationally derived principle of cultural integrity 
would have reinforced this deference and would have attacked the Supreme 
Court’s conclusion that the Indian’s religious practice in this case wasn’t 
specifically burdened by the proposed road construction.  Application of the 
cultural integrity norm would compel the recognition that American Indian 
religious beliefs and practices cannot be divorced from the land on which 
they are practiced.203  Unlike a Christian church which may be physically 
moved or rebuilt without irreparably damaging the core beliefs of the 
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churchgoers, destruction of American Indian sacred land itself destroys the 
underlying spirit and core of American Indian religion.204  Taken together, 
the “internal” self determination and cultural integrity principles would have 
strongly supported a different outcome to the Lyng decision—one that would 
have recognized that the Indian’s First Amendment religious expression 
rights were violated by the road construction through their sacred lands. 
 Lyng and Kartinyeri demonstrate the potential for “soft” enforcement.  
Such “soft” enforcement of the emerging customary international law of 
indigenous peoples’ rights can lead to the overturning of previously adverse 
court decisions and instead, secure and advance indigenous peoples’ rights. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 Utilizing customary international indigenous rights law as an 
interpretive force in federal law (acting as highly persuasive authority) is the 
most effective approach currently open to indigenous peoples in the United 
States and Australia wishing to use international law to advance their rights.  
This approach is effective while a more robust customary international law 
for indigenous peoples’ rights fully develops and until an international treaty 
schema can be put into place.  In the meantime, “soft” enforcement of 
emerging customary international law principles—especially the ones that 
have most crystallized, such as the right to cultural integrity and “internal” 
self determination—has the most realistic potential “to take effect in the 
actual lives of [indigenous] people.”205 
 In fact, sustained use by indigenous peoples of international legal 
precedent derived from the emerging international indigenous rights’ norms 
not only serves to secure rights for indigenous peoples in the United States 
and Australia on a case by case basis; it also serves to accelerate and further 
crystallize emerging customary law and the creation of an international 
comprehensive and binding treaty governing the rights of indigenous 
peoples worldwide. 
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